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Abstract
We  describe proof planning, a technique for the  global
control  of  search  in  automatic  theorem proving.  A
proof  plan  captures  the  common  patterns  of  reason-
ing in a family of similar  proofs and is  used to guide
the search for new  proofs in this  family. Proof plans
are  very similar  to  the  plans  constructed  by plan
formation techniques.  Some  differences  are  the  non-
persistence  of objects in  the mathematical  domain,  the
absence of  goal interaction  in  mathematics, the  high
degree of generality of proof plans, the use of a meta-
logic  to  describe preconditions in  proof planning and
the use of annotations in formulae to guide search.
Introduction
The  main  research  problem  in  automating  theorem
proving  is  the  combinatorial  ezplosion.  A mathem-
atical  theory  and conjectured  theorems of  it  can both
be  represented  in  a  computer using  mathematical  lo-
gic.  Proofs can be constructed  by applying logical  rules
forwards to  the  axioms of  a  theory  in  the  hope of  gen-
erating  the  conjecture  w or,  more often,  by applying
the  rules  backwards to  the  conjecture  in  the  hope of
reducing  it  to  axioms.  The combinatorial  explosion
occurs because there  is  choice,  i.e.  more than one rule
can be  applied  to  each of  the  initial  and intermediate
expressions.  We  must use  search  to  be  sure  to  try  out
all  the  possibilities.  The number of  intermediate  ex-
pressions  we must generate  grows super-exponentially
with the  length  of  the  desired  proof.  The storage  and
time requirements  to  find  a  proof  by exhaustive  search
are  so large that  it  is  infeasible  to construct the proofs
of  non-trivial  theorems.  Some  intelligence  is  needed
to  guide  the  search  for  a  proof along promising paths,
avoiding  less  promising  ones.  Since  human mathem-
aticians  can often  conquer the  combinatorial  explosion
and find  complex proofs  of  hard theorems,  it  is  prom-
ising  to  study  human proof  methods  as  a  source  of
inspiration  for  automatic  methods of  proof.
At  Edinburgh  we have  pioneered  a  technique  for
guiding  the  search  for  a  proof,  which we call  proof
planning.  A proof  plan  captures  the  common  patterns
of  reasoning in  families  of similar  proofs.  It  is  used to
provide a  global control  strategy  for  finding new  proofs
from the  same family.  Proof  planning  contrasts  with
the  more local  heuristics  which have previously  been
used  for  search  control.  That is,  instead  of  making a
separate  decision  at  each choice  point,  based on local
clues,  proof planning has some  sense of  the  overall  dir-
ection  of  the  proof.  This  seems to  accord  more with
the  intuitions  of  human  mathematicians that  they  first
make  a  global  plan of  a proof and then  fill  in  the  de-
tails.
In  this  paper we survey our work on proof planning.
We  then  go on to  compare and contrast  this  with  tra-
ditional  AI work on plan  formation.
The  Nature  of  Proof  Plans
We  have analysed  a  large  number  of  proofs,  especially
from  the  area  of  inductive  reasoning.  Common  pat-
terns  of  reasoning were identified  and represented  com-
putationally  as  proof plans.
Our proof planning  is  implemented using  three  kinds
of object:
Tactics:  are  computer programs which construct  part
of a  proof by applying rules  of  inference in  a theorem
proving system,  (Gordon et  al,  1979).  A simple tac-
tic  might apply only a  single rule  of inference;  a  com-
posite  tactic  will  be defined in  terms of simpler tac-
tics  and might construct  a whole proof.  Tactics  are
hierarchical;  some tactics  unpack into  sub-tactics.
Tactics  can be  composed  from rules  and sub-tactics
sequentially,  iteratively  and conditionally.
Methods: are  specifications  of  tactics.  In  particular,
a  method describes  the  preconditions  for  the  use  of
a  tactic  and the  effects  of  using it.  These precondi-
tions  and effects  are  syntactic  properties  of  the  lo-
gical  expressions  manipulated by the  tactic  and are
expressed in  a meta-logic.
Critics:  capture  common  patterns  of  failure  of  meth-
ods and suggest patches to  the  partial  proof.  A critic
is  associated  with a  method  and is  similar  in  struc-
ture,  except that  its  preconditions  describe  a situ-
ation  in  which the  method fails.  Instead  of  effects
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Our  CLAM  proof  planner  uses  methods  to  construct
a  customised  tactic  for  the  current  conjecture.  It
combines  genera.l-purpose  tactics  so  that  the  effects
of  earlier  ones  achieve  the  preconditions  of  later  ones.
This  customised  tactic  is  then  used  by  our  proof  edit-
ors,  Ovster  or  MoRusc,  to  try  to  prove  the  conjecture.
Sometimes  the  preconditions  of  a  method  succeed,  but
those  of  one  its  sub-methods  fail.  In  this  case  a  critic
may  suggest  a  patch  to  the  proof  plan.  This  product-
ive  use  of  failure  via  critics  is  made  possible  by  proof
planning  and  is  one  of  its  most  powerful  features.
Proof  planning  combines  two  previous  approaches
to  automated  reasoning:  the  use  of  tactics  and  the  use
of  meta-level  control.  The  meta-level  control  is  used
to  identify  appropriate  tactics  and  to  suggest  patches
when  they  fail.  Proof  plans  abstract  the  proof,  reveal-
ing  the  key  steps  and  the  structure  of  the  proof.  This
abstraction  can  be  used  to  construct  explanations  of
successful  proofs  and  give  reasons  for  the  failure  of  un-
successful  ones.
Implementation
Our implementation of  proof plans  consists  of  the  fol-
lowing parts.
1. An object-level  interactive  proof editor,  which can
be  driven  by tactics.  Initially,  we built  ONster,
(Bundy et  al,  1990),  a  proof  editor  for  construct-
ive  type  theory  closely  modelled  on Nuprl,  (Con-
stable  et  al,  1986).  More recently,  we have built
Mollusc,  (Richards  et  al,  1994),  a  generic  proof  ed-
itor,  i.e.  one  which  takes  a  logic  as  input  and  be-
comes  a proof editor  for  that  logic.
2. A variety  of  logics  implemented in  Mottusc,  includ-
ing  logics  which are:  first  order  and higher  order;
typed and untyped;  constructive  and classical.
3. A set  of  general-purpose  tactics  for  controlling
Motlusc  and/or  ONster.  A  method  for  each  of  these
tactics.  A  set  of  proof  critics  for  each  method.
4. A  plan  formation  program,  CLAM,  (Bundy  et  al,
1990),  for  reasoning  with  these  methods  and  critics
in  order  to  build  a  customised  tactic  for  each  con-
jecture  out  of  the  general-purpose  tactics.
5. A  co-operative  interface  to  CLAM,  called  Barnacle,
(Lore  et  al,  1995).  This  uses  proof  planning  to  ex-
plain  the  proof  to  the  user  and  assist  him/her  in
interacting  with  the  proof  process.
The  CLAM  system  and  the  proof  editors  have  been
tested  on  a  large  corpus  of  theorems  drawn  from  the  lit-
erature,  with  very  encouraging  results,  (Bundy  et  al,
1991;  Ireland  tz  Bundy,  1995).  The  planning  search
space  is  typically  many  orders  of  magnitude  smaller
than  the  object-level  search  space.  Furthermore,  the
heuristics  represented  in  the  preconditions  of  the  meth-
ods  ensure  that  backtracking  during  planning  is  rare.
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So  the  search  for  a  plan  is  computationally  very  cheap.
The  cost  of  this  dramatic  pruning  of  the  object-level
search  space  is  that  the  planning  system  is  incomplete.
Fortunately,  this  has  not  proved  a  serious  limitation;
the  CLAM  system  finds  proof  plans  for  a  high  per-
centage  of  the  theorems  tested  and  these  plans  are
turned  into  proofs  by  ONster  or  Mottusc.  Thus  the
proof  planning  has  proved  to  be  a  very  effective  way
of  tackling  the  combinatorial  explosion  in  automatic
theorem  proving.  Proof  planning  sometimes  fails  to
find  a  proof.  In  this  case  the  interaction  provided  by
Barnacle  is  at  a  much  higher  level  than  that  normally
available  from  interactive  provers.  It  can  use  the  proof
plan  to  explain  the  global  structure  of  the  proof  and
the  nature  of  the  plan  failure.  This  can  help  suggest
an  appropriate  patch.
Applications  to  Formal  Methods
Formal  methods  of  system  development  use  mathem-
atics  to  reason  about  computer  programs  or  electronic
circuits.  This  reasoning  includes:  verifying  that  a  sys-
tem  meets  a  specification  of  its  intended  behaviour;
synthesising  a  system  which  meets  such  a  specification;
and  transforming  one  system  into  a  more  efficient  one
meeting  the  same  specification.  Use  of  formal  meth-
ods  improves  the  reliability,  safety  and  security  of  IT
systems.  Unfortunately,  formal  methods  are  not  as
widely  used  as  they  might  be  due  to  the  high  skill
levels  and  long  development  times  required  to  apply
them.  Machine  assistance  is  available,  but  even  then  a
high  level  of  very  skilled  user  interaction  is  usually  re-
quired.  By  automating  much  more  of  the  proof  obliga-
tions  on  formal  methods  using  proof  planning  we  hope
significantly  to  reduce  both  the  development  times  and
skill  levels  required.  This  will  make  the  application  of
formal  methods  more  feasible  and  widespread.
Mathematical  induction I  is  required  for  reasoning
about  objects  or  events  containing  repetition,  e.g.
computer  programs  with  recursion  or  iteration,  elec-
tronic  circuits  with  feedback  loops  or  parameterised
components.  Since  repetition  is  ubiquitous  and  induct-
ive  reasoning  is  the  most  difficult  to  automate,  we  have
focussed  on  the  construction  of  proof  plans  for  math-
ematical  induction.  Our  inductive  proof  plans  are  very
successful.  They  guide  the  search  for  quite  complex
proofs  with  a  high  degree  of  success  and  a  very  low
branching  rate.  For  instance,  a  recent  success  was  to
verify  that  the  Gordon  Computer  (a  complete  micro-
processor)  met  its  specification,  (Cantu  et  al,  1996).
Inductive  Proof
Inductive  proofs  are  characterised  by the  application
of  induction  rules,  of  which a simple example is  Peano
induction:
P(o),  PC"  +  I))
Vn:nat.  P(,£)
I  Not  to  be  confused  wRh  the  learning  form  of  induction.
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base  case)  and whenever it  can be proved for  ~ it  can
be proved for  u+ |  (the  step  case) then it  can be proved
for all  u.
Peano  induction  is  merely  the  simplest  and  best
known inductive  rule  of  inference.  Similar  inductive
rules  are  available  for  every kind of recursively  defined
data-structure,  e.g.  integers,  lists,  trees,  sets,  etc.  For
instance,  the  analogous  rule  for lists  is:
P(~I),  Vk:  ~,  t:list(~).  (P(t)  ~  P(Iklt]))
Vl:l  st(  ). PCt)
where  [)tlt ]  means  ]~  consed  onto  t,  t  :  ¯  means  ~  is  of
type  ¯  and  Rst(~)  is  the  type  of  lists  of  objects  of  type
"t’.
Moreover,  it  is  not  necessary  to  traverse  such  data-
structures  in  the  obvious,  stepwise  manner;  they  can
be  traversed  in  any  order,  provided  it  is  well-founded,
i.e.  provided  there  is  no  infinite  ordered  sequence  of
smaller  and  smaller  elements.  Nor  is  induction  restric-
ted  just  to  data-structures,  for  instance,  it  is  possible
to  induce  over  the  control  flow  of  a  computer  program
or  the  time  steps  of  a  digital  circuit.
All  of  these  forms  of  induction  are  subsumed  by  a
single,  general  schema  of  well-founded  induction2:
x -- -, P(x)
vx:  .  P(x)
where  y-  is  some  we11-founded  relation  on  the  type  %
i.e.  there  is  no  infinite  sequence:  al  ~-  a2  >-  as  ~-  ....
The  data-structure,  control  flow,  time  step,  etc.,  over
which  induction  is  to  be  applied,  is  represented  by  the
type  "c.  The inductive  proof  is  formalised  in  a  many-
sorted  or  typed  logical  system.
Success in  proving  a  conjecture,  P,  by well-founded
induction  is  highly  dependent  on the  choice  of  x,
and y-.  For many  types,  "r,  there  is  an infinite  variety
of  possible  well-orderings,  >-.  Thus choosing an appro-
priate  induction  rule  to  prove a  conjecture  is  one of
the  most challenging  search  problems  to  be  solved  in
automating inductive  inference.
Heuristics  for  Inductive  Inference
The automation  of  inductive  inference  raises  a  number
of  unique difficulties  in search control.  These are:
Synthesis  of  Induction  Rules:  To prove  a  theorem
by induction,  one of  the  infinite  number  of  possible
induction  rules  must be synthesised.
Conjecturing  Lemmata:  Sometimes  a  lemma  re-
quired to  complete the  proof is  not already  available
and must  be  conjectured  and  then  proved.
Generallsation  of  Induction  Formulae:
Sometimes a  theorem cannot  be proved without  first
being generalised.
2Also known  as ncetherian  induction.
In  addition  to  these  special  search  problems  all  the
standard  problems  also  manifest  themselves,  e.g.  de-
ciding  if  and  when  to  make  a  case  split,  determining
the  witness  for  an  existential  quantifier.
We  have  tried  to  solve  these  search  control  problems
by  designing  tactics,  methods  and  critics.  A  few  such
tactics  can  prove  most  of  the  standard  inductive  theor-
ems  we  have  tested  them  on.  A  pictorial  representation
of  our  main  proof  methods  for  inductive  proof  is  given






Each  of  the  bozes  represents  a  method.  The
nesting  of  the  bores  represents  the  nesting  of
methods,  i.e.  an inner  method  is  a sub-method
of  the  one  immediately  outside  it.  The induc-
tion  strategy  is  a method for  a complete  applic-
ation  of  induction.  After  the  application  of  in-
duction  the  proof  is  split  into  one or more base
and step  cases  (one  of  each is  displayed  here).
Within  the  step  case  method,  rippling  is  used
to  reduce  the  difference  between  the  induction
conclusion  and induction  hypothesis.  The rip-
piing  method consists  of  repeated  applications
of  the  wave method.  The  rewritten  induction
conclusion  is  then  fertilized  with  the  induction
hypothesis.
Figure  I:  A  Proof  Plan  for  Induction
Rippling is  the  key tactic  in  our proof plans,  (Bundy
e$  al,  1993;  Basin  & Walsh,  1994).  The places  at
which the  induction  conclusion  differs  from the  in-
duction  hypothesis  are  marked by special  annotations
called  wave-fronts.  These  can  be  calculated  auto-
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The  wave-fronts  are  then  moved  out  of  the  way  so  that
a  copy  of  the  induction  hypothesis  appears  within  the
induction  conclusion.  This  movement  is  effected  by
special  rewrite  rules  called  wave-rules.  The  induction
hypothesis  can  then  be  applied  to  the  induction  con-
clusion  by  a  tactic  call  fertilize.  Rippling  involves  little
or  no  search.  An  example  is  given  in  figure  2.
Comparison  with  Plan  Formation
Work  on  plan  formation  in  AI  goes  back  to  the  60s
with  Cordell  Green’s  work  on  QA3  and  Nilsson’s  on
STRIPS.  Is  there  any  similarity  between  this  work  on
plan  formation  and  that  described  above?
Correspondence  between Proof Planning
and Plan formation
Plan  formation  builds  a  sequence  of  actions  to  be  ap-
plied  by  an  automated  agent,  e.g.  a  robot.  Proof  plan-
ning  builds  a  customised  tactic  for  guiding  a  proof.
So  some  apparent  differences  are  that  proof  planning
does  not  reason  about  time,  does  not  involve  a  ro-
bot  and  does  not  deal  with  the  manipulation  of  real
world  objects.  However,  these  differences  are  super-
ficial.  The  individual  mathematical  rule  applications
in  proof  planning  correspond  to  actions  in  plan  form-
ation.  Tactics  cdrrespond  to  actions  that  expand  into
sub-actions  during  hierarchical  planning.  The  objects
being  manipulated  in  proof  planning  are  mathematical
expressions.  Proof  plans  are  applied  by  an  automated
agent:  the  proof  editor.  The  sequence  of  manipula-
tions  do  define  some  notion  of  time,  e.g.  we  could  re-
gard  each  successive  formula  in  the  ripple  in  figure  2  as
being  a  world  state  at  a  different  moment  in  time.  So
proof  planning  can  be  viewed  as  plan  formation  in  the
traditional  AI  sense.  Even  the  concept  of  critic  has  its
origins  in  plan  formation.  It  was  originally  developed
by  Sussman  and  played  a  similar  role  to  our  critics  in
patching  failed  plans,  (Sussman,  1975).
Persistence  of Objects
One  real  difference  is  that  there  is  no  necessary  persist-
ence  of  objects  in  proof  planning,  whereas  there  usually
is  in  plan  formation.  In  figure  2  some  parts  of  the  ex-
pression  do  seem  to  persist.  For  instance,  throughout
the  ripple  there  is  one  h,  t  and  t  on  each  side  of  each
equation.  The  compound  objects,  however,  come  and
go,  e.g.  [hltl  occurs  twice  in  the  first  formula,  but  then
disappears  not  to  reappear.  In  some  proofs,  atomic
objects  can  behave  the  same  way.  For  instance,  if  the
rule  X  -{-  X  :~  2  ×  X  were  applied  then  two  occurrences
of  X  would  merge  into  one.  If  the  rule  0  ×  X  =~  0
were  applied  then  X  would  disappear  altogether.  The
non-persistence  of  objects  means  that  the  mathemat-
ical  world  cannot  be  described  merely  by  sets  of  re-
lations  between  objects,  since  this  assumes  they  per-
sist  over  time.  Fortunately,  the  mathematical  formulae
themselves  can  be  used  to  represent  the  world  state.
Goal  Interaction
Goal  interaction  is  a  major  issue  in  plan  formation
and  has  led  to  the  development  of  non-linear  plan-
ning,  (Tate,  1977;  Sacerdoti,  1977).  Goal  interaction
has  not,  so  far,  been  an  issue  in  proof  planning,  so
we  have  not  needed  to  use  non-linear  planning.  Be-
cause  of  the  non-persistence  of  mathematical  objects
it  is  not  obvious  what  goal  interaction  might  consist  of
in  mathematical  reasoning.
Something  a  little  like  it  does  arise  in  our  work  on
critics.  For  instance,  the  point  at  which  a  proof  breaks
down  may  not  be  the  point  at  which  the  proof  patch
needs  to  be  applied.  For  instance,  we  might  detect  the
need  for  a  case  split,  but  this  split  might  need  to  be
made  at  an  earlier  stage  in  the  proof  than  where  the
need  for  it  is  detected.  Similarly,  with  changes  to  the
form  of  induction  or  generalizations  of  the  theorem.
The  critics  currently  do  this  by  restarting  the  proof
from  an  earlier  point.  It  is  possible  that  a  non-linear
proof  representation  might  facilitate  the  incremental
growth,  patching  and  reorganisation  of  proofs.
Differences  in Domains
There  are  also  differences  in  the  domains  in  which  plan
formation  and  proof  planning  work.  Plan  formation
must  deal  with  incomplete  and  uncertain  knowledge
about  the  world  and  the  automated  agent  may  have  to
work  with  collaborators  and/or  against  opponents.  In
proof  planning,  our  knowledge  about  the  mathematical
world  is  complete,  i.e.  we  know  exactly  what  conjec-
ture  to  prove  and  what  axioms  to  prove  it  with.  Nor
are  there  other  agents  assisting  or  opposing  our  proof
attempts.  Proof  planning,  however,  can  be  adapted
to  deal  with  uncertainty,  collaborators  and  opponents.
We  have  successfully  tested  proof  planning  by  apply-
ing  it  to  non-mathematical  domains,  including  the  card
game  bridge,  (Frank et  al,  1992).  In  this  domain, un-
certainty  arises  because you do not  know what cards
are  held by the  other players.  Players  collaborate  with
one other  player  and are  opposed by two others.
Hierarchical  Planning
As illustrated  in figure  1,  proof plans are  hierarchical.
The  tactics  of  proof  planning  correspond  to  the  action
expansions  of  plan  formation.  Like  actions,  tactics  may
unpack  into  several  sub-tactics  which  may,  in  turn,  un-
pack  into  sub-sub-tactics.  The  unpacking  may  involve
recursion  or  conditionals.  There  do,  however,  seem  to
be  some  differences  between  the  realisation  of  hierarch-
ical  planning  in  proof  planning  and  plan  formation.
Firstly,  we  use  only  a  few  tactics  (about  a  dozen)
compared  to  the  much  larger  number  typically  used  in
plan  formation.  Our  tactics  are  much  more  general.
Rippling,  for  instance,  is  not  only  used  in  all  inductive
proofs,  but  we  have  also  found  applications  in  other
areas  of  mathematics,  e.g.  for  summing  series,  (Walsh
et  al,  1992),  and  for  proving  limit  theorems  in  ana-
lysis,  (Yoshida  et  al,  1994).  Action  expansions,  on  the
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VK, L:Kst(x).  rev(K <> L)  = rev(L)  <> 
Induction  Hypothesis:
rev(t  <>  t) = rev(t)  <>  rev(t)
Induction  Conclusion  and  Ripple  :
: ""¯¯  ""  " " ""¯  ""  "¯¯"  ""  ""::q  ~ ~  ~  ~  "¯:" ": ¯ : T ¯ " " ¯ " ¯ ¯¯ " ¯¯ " ¯¯ ¯¯ ¯ "¯¯¯¯¯  ¯¯ " ¯ ::~:  ~  :: :: :: ¯ : .~  ¯<~ :.~.(.t..<~..t~!~:~?.~; = ..~(9.<>  ~.~.(0.~i:i~]::
........  .......
The conjecture  to  be proved is  that  list  reversal,
rev,  distributes  over  hst  append,  <>,  with
sw~tch  in  the  argument  order.  We use  the
Prolog  convention  that  variables  are  in  upper
case  and constants  in  lower  case.  We also  use
the  Prolog notation  for  list  cons,  i.e.  [HdITt].
X:ti.st(x)  means that  X is  a list  of  objects  of
type "r.
The proof  is  by  induction  on  K.  Only  the  step
case  is  shown.  The induction  conclusion  is  an-
notated  to  show its  similarities  to  and differ-
ences  from  the  induction  hypothesis.  The  dif-
ferences  are  the  bits  which are  inside  a shaded
area.  These  are  called  wave-fronts.  The  un-
shaded  bits  inside  the  shaded  bo=es are  called
wave-holes.  Rippling  makes  the  wave-fronts
bigger  and bigger  until  a copy of  the  induction
hypothesis  appears  wholly  within  a  wave-hole.
When this  happens  this  part  of  the  induction
conclusion  can  be  replaced  with  true  and  the
remaining goal  is  [b.]  = [h],  which is  trivially
true.  We  call  this  final  step  fertilization.
Rippling  is  achieved  by  applying  wave-rules.
The  wave-rules  used  in  this  ezample  can  be
found  in  figure  3.  Rules  (1)  and (2)  are  applied
to  the  left-  and right-hand  sides,  respectively,
of  the  first  line,  then  rules  (2)  and (3)  to  the
second line,  and finally  rule  (4).
Figure  2:  An example of  rippling
x <> =  ii x .T
=
r
Wave-rules  are  also  annotated  to  show the  sim-
ilarities  and differences  between the  left-  and
right-hand  sides  of  the  rules.  To apply  a wave-
rule,  the  left-hand  side  is  matched  against
a  subezpression  of  the  induction  conclusion,
which is  then  replaced  with  the  right-hand  side.
This  matching  includes  alignment  of  the  an-
notations  as  well  as  the  normal  matching.
This  additional  condition  severely  restricts  the
choices  and  reduces  search.  A  measure  is
defined  using  the  height  of  the  wave-fronts.  By
definition  this  measure must be  strictly  less  on
the  right-hand  side  of  each  rule  than  on  the
left-hand  side.
Rules  (1)  and  (2)  come  from  the  recursive
definitions  of  <> and rev,  respectively.  Rule
(5)  is  the  associativity  of <>.  Rule  (~)  is  the
equality  congruence rule  for  <>. Note that  rule
(4)  is  an implication  from right  to  left,  but be-
cause  ClAM  reasons  backwards,  the  direction
of  rewriting  is  inverted.  In  the  example of  fig-
ure  2,  a  weakened  form  of  rule  (4)  is  used,
in  which  a  wave-hole  on  the  right-hand  side
of  each equality  is  shaded  and becomes part  of
the  wave-fronL  When proved,  the  conjecture  of





Figure  3:  Examples of  wave-rules
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applications.  Each ripple  uses a  different  set  of  wave-
rules  and  the  number of  rules  used  varies  according
to  need.  Newly proved  conjectures  may be  automat-
ically  recognised  as  wave-rules,  annotated  and used in
future  ripples.  Action expansions  usually  incorporate
a  fixed  set  of  lower level  actions.  Tactics  in  math-
ematical  domains can  involve  search  and  may not  be
guaranteed  to  terminate,  e.g.  they  may call  complete
theorem provers  which are  semi-decision  procedures.
Action  expansions  are  usually  deterministic  and ter-
minating.
Secondly,  and crucially,  tactics  have meta-logical
preconditions,  whereas action  expansions  have object-
level  preconditions.  Our rules  and  tactics  describe
properties  of  numbers,  lists,  trees  and  other  data-
structures,  i.e.  they  are  object-level.  The precon-
ditions  of  these  tactics  describe  syntactic  properties
of  mathematical  formulae,  i.e.  they  reason  about  the
object-level  representation.  We  have  developed  a
meta-logic for  representing  these syntactic  properties.
For instance,  the definition  of  a wave-rule discusses  the
similarities  and differences  between the left-  and right-
hand sides  of  the  rule.  The preconditions  of  the  wave
tactic  require  wave-fronts to  be present  within the  goal
and for  the  matching  of  rule  and goal  to  include  the
alignment  of  their  wave-fronts.  Such meta-level  pre-
conditions permit a  level  of generality  for  tactics  which
would not  otherwise  be  possible.
Search  Control
Search  is  controlled  in  proof  planning  by a  combin-
ation  of  tactics  and meta-level  reasoning.  Meta-level
reasoning  has  a  long  history  in  AI and was first  used
in  plan  formation  in  MOLGEN,  (Stefik,  1981).  Con-
trol  knowledge  referring  to  the  global  development  of  a
plan has also  been used in  plan  formation.  It  was first
suggested  for  SOAR  (Laird  et  al,  1987)  and  further
explored  in  Prodigy  (Minton  et  al,  1989).  One way
in  which proof  planning  extends  this  is  in  its  use  of
annotation  to  guide search,  i.e.  the  use of  wave-fronts
to  guide  rippling  to  preserve  some parts  of  a  formula
while moving  others  in  a desired  direction.
The depth  and  complexity  of  reasoning  arising  in
mathematics  is  typically  greater  than  that  required
in  plan  formation.  The attention  that  has  been paid
to  search control  issues  in  proof planning reflects  this
greater  demand  for  an efficient  solution.
Conclusion
In  this  paper  we have  described  proof  planning  and
compared it  to  plan  formation.  Proof  planning  com-
bines  the  use  of  tactics  with  meta-level  control.  It
is  implemented by:  tactics,  which correspond  to  ac-
tion  expansions;  methods,  which specify  tactics  using
a  meta-logic;  and critics,  which capture  common  pat-
terns  of  failure  and suggest  patches  to  the  plan.  Proof
plans  abstract  the  global  structure  of  a proof and this
can be used to  guide search,  explain  the  proof and sug-
gest  patches  when  the  plan fails.
Our main application  area  is  inductive  proof,  es-
pecially  as  used  to  reason  about  programs and  hard-
ware.  Our proof  plans  for  mathematical  induction  are
both restrictive  and successful;  they require  very little
search in  finding  quite  complex proofs,  but have a  high
success rate.
The main differences  between  proof  planning  and
plan  formation  are:
¯ the  non-persistence  of  objects  in  the  mathematical
domain;
¯ the  absence of  goal  interaction  in  the  mathematical
domain, and hence the  adequacy of  linear  planning;
¯  the  high degree of  generality  of  proof plans;
¯ the  use of  a  meta-logic  for  describing  the  precondi-
tions  of  tactics,  and
¯  the  use  of  meta-level  annotations  to  guide  search.
It  would  be  interesting  to  explore  whether  some  of  the
ideas  developed  in  proof  planning  can  be  imported  into
plan  formation,  and  vice  versa.
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